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MARYLAND FORECLOSURE MEDIATION - WORKING OR
WANING? A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STATE’S
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM
Chelsea Jones*
INTRODUCTION
In mid-January 2012, members of the Maryland Home Preservation Task Force testified before a state House committee with a
number of recommendations aimed at solving Maryland’s foreclosure
crisis.1 The foreclosure problem is particularly acute in Prince
George’s County, Maryland, a predominately African American county neighboring Washington, DC. Thirty-one percent of the state’s foreclosure events are located within the county.2 In the quarter from January to September 2011, there were 22,401 Notices of Intent to
Foreclose (“NOIs”) in Prince George’s County.3 Elsewhere in the
state, Baltimore City and Baltimore County were in second and third
place, respectively, with nearly 12,000 NOIs each.4 Across the United
States, foreclosure numbers continue to fluctuate. In September of the
third quarter of 2012, national foreclosure filings, default notices,
scheduled auctions, and bank repossessions of properties were at their
lowest rate since 2007. 5 In states such as New York and New Jersey,
however, third quarter foreclosure activity increased substantially.6
*

J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. I would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and
Class for their tireless assistance during the publication process.
1
Jamie Smith Hopkins, Suggestions to Stave off Foreclosures, BALT. SUN,
Jan. 19, 2012, at A14.
2
Anika Anand, Affluent Black County Mired in Mortgage Mess,
NBCNEWS.COM (June 14, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/43343
008/ns/mortgage_mess/#.Trm-KlYVLds; MD. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV.,
PROPERTY FORECLOSURES IN MARYLAND THIRD QUARTER 2012 3 (2012), available
at http://mdhope.dhcd.maryland.gov/pages/MoreNews.aspx.
3
MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE, MARYLAND FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE
REPORT 18 (2012).
4
Id.
5
Press Release, Foreclosure Activity Drops to 5-Year Low in September,
RealtyTrac (Oct. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/september-and-q32012-us-foreclosure-market-report-7424.
6
Id. Both New York and New Jersey are judicial foreclosure states. See infra
Part III (discussing the different types of foreclosure processes).
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These variations represent the lingering effects of the burst of the
housing bubble.7
It is now widely understood that the collapse of the subprime
market in 2007 was the catalyst in an economic avalanche that this
country is still trying to claw its way through.8 The surge in subprime
loans was evident in Maryland where, “[B]etween the first quarter of
2003 and the second quarter of 2007, the share of Maryland’s subprime loans as a percentage of all mortgage loans in service grew from
a low of 2.6 percent to a historic high of 12.8 percent.”9 The United
States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs issued a recent report titled, “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis:
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” which pointed to high-risk loans as
a major contributing factor of the “Great Recession.”10 The report
identified a number of other key contributors to the economic crisis
such as the failure of government oversight, inflated credit ratings for
risky U.S. mortgage backed securities, and banks that created highly
complex financial instruments that garnered billions of dollars.11 This
“perfect storm” sent ripples through the housing market, and in the
first quarter of 2007, subprime loans in Maryland accounted for more
than half of all serious deficiencies.12
States around the country tried to respond to the housing crisis
by enacting legislation to slow its progress. 13 Maryland’s effort came
in the form of a foreclosure mediation bill, which took effect on July 1,
2010.14 The bill allows homeowners to meet with their lenders and a
neutral third-party--an administrative law judge--to avoid foreclosure.15 Although many Marylanders facing foreclosure may be em7

Kathryn J. Byun, The U.S. Housing Bubble and Bust, MONTHLY LABOR
REV., December 2012, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/12/art1full.
pdf.
8
MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 12.
9
Id.
10
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE (Comm. Print 2011).
11
Id. at 2–12.
12
MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 12.
13
Foreclosure Mediation Programs by State, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
http://www.nclc.org/issues/foreclosure-mediation-programs-by-state.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
14
H.D. 472, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
15
Ovetta Wiggins, Maryland Bill Provides Foreclosure Mediation for Homeowners, WASH. POST (April 15, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/14/AR2010041404602.html.
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powered through legislation to take action, the available figures paint a
less enthusiastic picture.16 In the program’s first year, only 317 cases
out of roughly 33,000 active foreclosures were resolved in mediation.17 Maryland is not the only state that has seen low foreclosure mediation success rates. Florida’s rates were so low that the Florida Supreme Court decided to shutter its program altogether.18 Not all states,
however, have encountered such a lackluster response. Philadelphia’s
foreclosure mediation program19 has seen remarkable success rates. In
the first year of the program, “[eighty-five] percent of borrowers who
had reached agreements with their lenders . . . were still in their homes
eighteen months later.” 20 With participation rates that vary state-tostate, firm conclusions about the country’s collective response to foreclosure mediation as a tool to slow foreclosures are hard to pin down.
This Comment examines Maryland’s foreclosure mediation
law and takes a comparative look at city and state mediation programs
across the country. This Comment then analyzes the inherent flaws of
mediation that disproportionately affect minority communities and
suggests litigation as a better avenue to vindicate the rights of homeowners who were the targets of predatory lending. Given that foreclosure mediation is currently law in Maryland, this Comment suggests
that a switch to an “opt-out” or “automatic mediation” program will
capture more homeowners eligible for foreclosure mediation. Finally,
this Comment examines a recent Maryland Court of Appeals case involving whistleblower protection laws that might have broad application to financial institutions and the effort to strengthen loss mitigation
strategies.

16

Due to the confidentiality surrounding foreclosure mediation many of the
most recent participation figures are unreported.
17
Gary Haber, Few Marylanders Facing Foreclosure Seeking Mediation,
BALT. BUS. J. (Jan. 18, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/
2011/01/18/few-marylanders-facing-foreclosure.html.
18
Kathleen Haughney, Florida Justice Shuts Down Foreclosure Mediation,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 20, 2011, at A10.
19
Philadelphia’s program is formally called the “Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program” and was instituted by the Court of Common Pleas. See
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program, PHILA. CTS,
http://www.courts.phila.gov/mfdp/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
20
Al Heavens, On the House: Phila.’s Anti-Foreclosure Program a Success
Story, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 3, 2011, 3:01 AM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/al_heavens/20110703_On_the_House__Phi
la__s_anti-foreclosure_program_a_success_story.html.
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I. WHAT IS MEDIATION?
Mediation is defined as “a method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing
parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.”21 Mediation is often described under the umbrella of “alternative dispute resolution,” otherwise known as, “ADR.” A mediator’s role is important to the result
that mediation produces. As a result, mediation can be directive, evaluative, facilitative, or relational/psychosocial.22 At a minimum, mediation is a vehicle for the parties subject to the mediation to engage in a
constructive dialogue where one party states a position on an issue and
the adverse party responds accordingly. The mediator “supervises the
exchange of information and negotiations by helping the parties to redefine their respective issues and positions and bargain realistically.”23
Mediation proceedings are kept highly confidential. In fact, Rule 17109 of the Maryland Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution states,
“[A] mediator and any person present or otherwise participating in the
mediation at the request of the mediator shall maintain the confidentiality of all mediation communications and may not disclose or be
compelled to disclose mediation communications in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding.”24
Mediation has been touted as a superior alternative to litiga25
tion. Backlogged courts and the high costs of going to trial are often
large incentives for parties to settle their disputes out of court. 26 Mediators may also candidly describe to parties the hurdles they might face
if a case is brought to trial. A trial-lawyer turned professor gave this
description of a mediation experience:, “[O]ur experienced mediator
21

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004).
Josefina M. Rendón, Under the Justice Radar?: Prejudice in Mediation and
Settlement Negotiations, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 347, 350 (2005) (stating that directive occurs “where the neutral steers the parties towards his/her idea of what is
appropriate for the parties;” 2) evaluative—“where the neutral assesses the parties'
legal arguments and chances in court;” 3) facilitative—“where the mediator merely
aids the parties in their negotiations without imposing his/her own ideas or evaluating the parties' case;” 4) relational or psychosocial—“focuses on the parties' relationship rather than on achieving settlement”). Id.
23
Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans “Are Not Carbon Copies” of White
Americans – The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes,
13 OHIO ST. L. ON DISP. RESOL. 405, 410 (1998).
24
MD. R. 17-109(a).
25
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359–63 (1985).
26
Id.
22
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gave both sides a serious reality check. In meticulous fashion, he identified evidentiary and other obstacles we would have to overcome at
trial.”27 In the family law context, mediation disputes are resolved in
far less time than litigation.28 Often, the time it takes to settle a dispute
via mediation is between three and twenty-five hours, whereas “litigants may wait six to twenty-four months just to get a trial date.”29
The practice of mediation dates back to 1800 B.C. when the
Mari Kingdom, in what is today known as Syria, resolved disputes
with other kingdoms.30 In America, ADR’s early roots can be found in
both social and government contexts. Local churches played mediatorlike roles, encouraging disputants to resolve conflict through a mutual
agreement.31 The negotiating and coalition building at the Constitutional Convention has also been recognized as an ADR triumph.32
From early American History to present day, ADR, and mediation in
particular, have grown in acceptance.33 A layperson might be most familiar with mediation in the family law context where it is often employed to settle family disputes,34 but recently, many states have
adopted mediation as a tool in combating the foreclosure crisis.
II. MARYLAND’S FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM
Before Maryland’s foreclosure mediation bill was passed,
Governor Martin O’Malley testified before the state legislature’s
House Environmental Matters Committee.35 There, he touted the benefits of the proposed bill.36 The Governor laid out four of its major
components. First, it “requires servicers to provide critical information
about timelines and tools available to borrowers that can save their
27

Michael Goldsmith, Confessions of A Litigator: The Surprising Benefits of
Mediation, UTAH B.J., May/June 2009, at 11.
28
Mabry, supra note 23, at 413.
29
Id.
30
JEROME T. BARRETT WITH JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION xxv (2004).
31
Id. at 42–43.
32
Id. at 47–48.
33
Id. at 266–68.
34
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1363–64
(1985).
35
Governor Martin O’Malley, Speech before the Md. House Envtl. Matters
Comm. (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://www.governor.maryland.gov/speeches/
100216a.asp.
36
Id.

Jones

2/13/2013 3:59 PM

2012]

MARYLAND FORECLOSURE MEDIATION

401

homes.”37 Second, the bill prevents servicers from commencing a
foreclosure action “until the servicer can file an affidavit that they
have offered or tried to offer the borrower any . . . loan modification
and loss mitigation options . . . available.”38 Third, borrowers “must
have the right to mediation before a foreclosure sale can take place.”39
Finally, servicers are required to pay a foreclosure-filing fee to “help
fund housing counselors and defray judicial costs.”40
Under Maryland’s law, when a lender sends the homeowner a
Notice of Intent to Foreclose, it is also required to include a number of
additional documents including a loss mitigation application for programs applicable to the loan.41 If a loss mitigation analysis has not yet
been completed, the lender should include contact information for
nonprofit and government foreclosure resources that are available to
the homeowner.42 The lender is also required to include a preprinted
envelope with the address of the attorney in charge of handling the
foreclosure for the lender.43 From this point, homeowners have fortyfive days to respond before a foreclosure sale of the property may occur.44 If the lender ultimately files a complaint with the court to foreclose, the lender must include, among other things, a final loss mitigation affidavit and a $300 dollar filing fee.45 Homeowners have only
fifteen days after receiving the lender’s final loss mitigation affidavit
to request foreclosure mediation affirmatively. A fifty-dollar
waiveable filing fee must accompany the request.46 Once a request for
foreclosure mediation has been filed, the property cannot go to sale until at least fifteen days after the mediation has been held. 47 It is important to note that the lender or servicer can move to strike the homeowner’s request for foreclosure mediation within fifteen days of
receiving the request.48
After receiving the homeowner’s request for foreclosure mediation, the court has five days to transmit the request to the Office of
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
H.D. 472, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.; MD. R. CIV. P. CIR. CT. 2-322(e).
38
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Administrative Hearings.49 Within sixty days after transmittal, the parties must conduct a foreclosure mediation.50 The homeowner is required to be present at the meeting and may be accompanied by a lawyer or housing counselor.51 The lender or a representative must also be
present along with a neutral mediator.52 The parties have sixty days to
reach an agreement, and if the time expires with no extension by the
Office of Administrative Hearings, the foreclosure attorney may
schedule the foreclosure sale.53 In October 2011, the Office of the
Commissioner of Financial Regulation set forth new regulations. These rules revised the notices provided to homeowners in risk of foreclosure, making them clearer.54 In a sample Notice of Intent to Foreclose
provided on the Maryland Department of Labor Licensing and Regulation website, the language at the top of the document reads in large,
underlined letters, “There may be options to avoid foreclosure, but you
must act immediately.”55
Although the notice clearly conveys the urgency of taking action quickly, it does not and perhaps is not the best vehicle to convey
to homeowners why mediation is worth their time and money. In predominately minority communities, many lenders engaged in predatory
lending and led unsuspecting homeowners down the path to foreclosure.56 It is not inconceivable to imagine the questions a homeowner
might have upon receiving a Notice of Intent to Foreclose. On whose
terms will the mediation agreement rest? Where predatory lending exists, will a lawsuit better vindicate a homeowner’s rights? Is the neutral
mediator really neutral? What exactly is mediation? To the state’s
credit, included in the Notice of Intent to Foreclose must be contact information for free housing counseling services as well as the web address for the state’s foreclosure resource.57

49

H.D. 472, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
MD. CODE REGS. § 9.3.12 (2011).
55
MD. DEP’T OF LAB., LICENSING & REGULATION, APPENDIX A: NOTICE OF
INTENT TO FORECLOSE 1 (2011), available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/
finregforms.shtml.
56
See Editorial, Fair Lending and Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011,
at A28.
57
Id.
50
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III. MEDIATION PROGRAMS ACROSS THE COUNTRY – A COMPARATIVE
LOOK
As a result of the housing crisis, many cities and states have
enacted foreclosure mediation laws or implemented foreclosure mediation proceedings.58 Though the goal, stemming the tide of foreclosures
and keeping financially troubled homeowners in their homes, is common among many states with foreclosure mediation laws, the methods
of implementation vary from state to state. The Center for American
Progress, a left-leaning Washington-based think tank conducted a review of state-based foreclosure mediation programs in June 2010 and
noted the differences in mediation program structure. Some foreclosure mediation programs are judicial in nature; thus, the lender initiates a suit in court to foreclose on the property.59 Some states have
non-judicial programs where the court system is not involved.60 Other
states require homeowners to “opt-in” to the foreclosure mediation,
meaning the homeowner must affirmatively request the mediation service, whereas in other states, the process is automatic, requiring mediation whenever a foreclosure is initiated through a foreclosure sale or
through the filing of a judicial foreclosure.61 Many of these automatic
foreclosure programs occur in judicial foreclosure states and see much
higher rates of participation than opt-in states.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’s Residential Mortgage Foreclosure
Diversion Pilot Program is often characterized as the gold standard of
mediation programs.62 Philadelphia’s program was initiated in April
2008 and is mandatory.63 Before a foreclosure sale can proceed, the
parties must participate in a conciliation conference.64 Philadelphia’s
program provides homeowners with a hotline where they can speak directly with a housing counselor prior to meeting with the lender’s representative during mediation. Philadelphia also does not automatically
58

The principal difference between the two is that some programs are legislatively created while others are judicially created.
59
ALON COHEN & ANDREW JAKABOVICS, NOW WE’RE TALKING: A LOOK AT
CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS AND HOW TO BRING
THEM TO SCALE 3 (2010).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 21; Peter S. Goodman, Philadelphia Gives Homeowners a Way to Stay
Put, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009 at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/
business/18philly.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
63
Heavens, supra note 20.
64
HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION AND MITIGATION
PROGRAM MODELS 33 (2011).
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assign the parties a mediator. Instead, the parties informally meet with
a retired judge, a Judge Pro Temp. If the dispute cannot be resolved
with a conciliation conference, the court stands at the ready to appoint
a mediator to commence a private meeting. In December 2008, more
than six months after the city’s mediation program was initiated, positive results were evident. Of the 2,331 homeowners who participated
in a conciliation conference, 2,270 avoided foreclosure.65 Of that total,
603 homeowners resolved with their lenders, 244 averted bankruptcy,
and 1,423 postponed mediation to talk with a housing counselor.66 As
of December 16, 2010, unofficial court reports indicate that 13,000
conferences have taken place, resulting in borrowers maintaining
2,500 and 3,000 homes outright.67
Not all foreclosure mediation programs have been as successful
as Philadelphia’s program. In December 2011, the Florida Supreme
Court issued an order formally terminating its state-managed mediation foreclosure program.68 Before its program was shuttered, Florida,
like Philadelphia, used the automatic foreclosure mediation method.
This method virtually requires no additional homeowner action because the state schedules the first mediation session once the mortgage
lender initiates foreclosure proceedings.69 Prior to a Florida Supreme
Court order in 2009 aimed at developing a coordinated state response,
Florida’s twenty judicial circuits constructed their own distinct approaches to the foreclosure crisis.70 Some counties, like that of MiamiDade, implemented mediation programs where the success rate was as
high as seventy-four percent.71
In an effort to streamline the success of Florida’s foreclosure
mediation program, former Chief Justice of Florida’s highest court,
Peggy Quince, adopted a model whereby, “[A]ll foreclosure cases in
state courts that involve residential homestead property will be referred to mediation, unless the plaintiff and borrower agree otherwise
or unless pre-suit mediation that substantially complies . . . with the
managed mediation program requirements has been conducted.”72 Less
65

Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
In re Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure
Cases, No. AOSC11-44 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2011).
69
COHEN & JAKABOVICS, supra note 59, at 3, 5.
70
Sharon Press, Mortgages Foreclosure Mediation in Florida - Implementation Challenges for an Institutionalized Program, 11 NEV. L.J. 306, 308–14 (2011).
71
COHEN & JAKABOVICS, supra note 59, at 17.
72
Press, supra note 70, at 334.
66
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than two years later, in 2011, an order from the current Chief Justice of
the Florida Supreme Court, Charles Canady, ended the program. His
order stated, “The Court has reviewed the reports on the program and
determined that it cannot justify continuation of the program. Accordingly, upon issuance of this administrative order, the statewide managed mediation program is terminated.”73
Unlike Pennsylvania, and formerly Florida, Nevada is an “optin” state.74 Its mediation program went into effect in July 2009, and by
August of that year, only ten mediations had been scheduled despite
having more than 7,500 foreclosure filings per month.75 The state’s
foreclosure rate is still among the highest in the nation, but there have
been substantial improvements in the law and its participation rate. By
the end of April 2010, after increasing the number of mediators, requests for mediation totaled nearly 8,000.76 Figures obtained by the
Reno-Gazette Journal, one of Nevada’s leading newspapers, show that
from July 1, 2009 to March 31, 2011, more than 15,000 distressed borrowers requested mediation.77 Of that number, more than 10,000 borrowers completed mediations.78 Fifty-two percent of completed mediations resulted in no foreclosure and thirty-six percent resulted in
homeowners staying in their homes.79
A number of states lack foreclosure mediation programs altogether. Utah, Idaho,80 and Minnesota all currently do not have a foreclosure program on the books, although there have been legislative efforts to enact mediation programs.81 Minnesota Governor Tim
Pawlenty vetoed a 2009 bill, the Homestead Mediation Lender Act,
which would have expanded the state’s Farmer Lender mediation pro73

In re Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure
Cases, No. AOSC11-44 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2011).
74
COHEN & JAKABOVICS, supra note 59, at 3.
75
Id. at 10.
76
Id.
77
Jason Hidalgo, Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Program Cites Confidentiality in Refusal to Release Records, RENO GAZETTE J., July 19, 2011, at Business
Section.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Idaho’s bill does not require mediation, but it does require the lender to provide the mortgagor with loan modification documents. See H.B. 331, 2011 Leg., 61st
Sess. (Idaho 2011).
81
See supra note 13 for a list of foreclosure mediation programs by state that
fails to list Utah, Idaho, or Minnesota; but see S.B. 80, 2011 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011)
available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/foreclosures-2011-legisla
tion.aspx, for Utah’s attempt to pass foreclosure mediation legislation; see also infra
note 84 and accompanying text, for Minnesota’s attempt.
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gram.82 Governor Pawlenty took issue with a number of the bill’s provisions, including the $125 foreclosure fee, stating the program should
be able to support itself.83 The Housing crisis has hit minority communities in St. Paul particularly hard. A recent report by a Minneapolis
faith-based group, Isaiah, found that “[a]lmost half of the city’s vacant
housing is located in a minority neighborhood, although minority
neighborhoods contain just 20% of the housing units in the city.”84
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mediation has Inherent Structural Flaws that Negatively
Affect Minority Communities.
Mediation, despite all of its benefits, is not without its shortcomings. One legal commentator noted that the African American
community’s “historic experiences” of racial discrimination, slavery,
and Jim Crow laws, which were “sanctioned and protected by law,”
have led to a distrust of legal and judicial systems.85 Moreover, the
commentator said, African-Americans are “more likely to consult
‘close family, friends and spiritual leaders’ to discuss ‘core problems’
first.”86 It is not inconceivable that the lingering distrust may only be
amplified when the adverse party in mediation is one that seeks to take
something away from the other party. This is especially true in the
context of foreclosures that are the result of predatory lending.
With distrust as the backdrop, mediation’s inherent flaws are
exacerbated. Some scholars have noted that mediation allows weaker
parties to be manipulated by “not-so-neutral” mediators.87 These mediators may have objectives that are at odds with those of the parties
subject to mediation. For instance, some mediators have “the settle all
82

Betsy Sundquist, Legislative Efforts to Hold Back Foreclosure Tide in Minnesota Died in Committee, SAINT PAUL LEGAL LEDGER CAPITOL REPORT, May 28,
2009; See also H.J. Cummins, Foreclosure Mediation, Relief for the Little Guy, the
STAR TRIBUNE, March 23, 2011 available at http://www.startribune.com/local/34818
349.html?page=all&prepage=2&c=y#continue.
83
Sundquist, supra note 82.
84
Gita Sitaramiah, Housing Crisis Effect on Minorities Decried, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 10, 2011, at Business Section (citing U.S. data).
85
Janice Tudy-Jackson, Non-Traditional Approaches to ADR Processes that
Engage African-American Communities and African-American ADR Professionals,
39 CAP. U. L. REV. 921, 932–33 (2011).
86
Id. at 933 (quoting FREDDY A. PANIAGUA, ASSESSING AND TREATING
CULTURALLY DIVERSE CLIENTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1994)).
87
Rendón, supra note 22, at 353.
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costs mentality while others may have their own, well-intentioned, but
misguided idea of what is appropriate, fair or likely to happen at trial.”88 Additionally, the confidential nature of mediation has been criticized as “hiding malfeasance.”89 In fact, the Reno Gazette-Journal recently expressed frustration at the state’s strict mediation
confidentiality laws: “The program cited confidentiality in denying requests for six other records. Another six were not provided because the
information was not available.”90 The article further commented,
“[T]he records that were not provided strike at the heart of measuring
the programs’ success.”91
In a widely cited 1985 article published in the Wisconsin Law
Review, Richard Delgado raised early concerns about ADR and its potential for fostering class-based prejudice and abuse.92 There, he said
that the informal nature of ADR renders it susceptible to an exploitation of groups that are already “particularly vulnerable to prejudice.”93
Delgado notes that several theories explain racial or ethnic prejudice.94
Among them are social-psychological theories of prejudice.95 These
theories explain racial prejudice as behavior that is learned through
groups and generally emerges in early childhood.96 Delgado argues
that prejudiced people are least likely to act-out or express their feelings if the feelings in question, “deviate from what is expected.”97
When that deviation from the norm occurs, prejudiced people will
change or suppress their behavior.98 It is the formal structure of adjudication that serves as a check on the behavior of prejudiced individuals.99 Conversely, “ADR increases the risk of prejudice toward vulnerable disputants . . . . [T]he rules and structure of formal justice tend to
suppress bias, whereas informality tends to increase it.”100 Delgado
notes that prejudice is most likely to take root “when a person of low
status and power confronts a person or institution of high status and

88

Id. at 354.
Id.
90
Hidalgo, supra note 77.
91
Id.
92
Delgado et al., supra note 34, at 1361.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1375.
95
Id. at 1380.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1387.
98
Delgado et al., supra note 34, at 1387.
99
Id. at 1388.
100
Id. at 1400.
89
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power.”101 The “minority” party is also “less likely to press his or her
claim energetically” and this effect is compounded when the mediator
is a member of the superior group.102 Proponents of ADR argue that its
informality is its virtue because parties that might be threatened by
formal court procedures might be more willing to participate in an informal forum.103
B. Formal Court Litigation is a Better Vehicle to Vindicate the Rights
of Minority Communities that Have Fallen Victim to
Predatory Lending.
Many low-income neighborhoods are breeding grounds for
risky, high interest lending.104 Low-income communities are often the
targets of “gotcha” gimmicks, and often, these tactics go undetected
until they grow so egregious and out-of-control that nothing short of
judicial intervention will resolve the problem. The practice of predatory lending shares a similar narrative. The United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development describes predatory lending as practices engaged by appraisers, mortgage brokers, and home improvement
contractors who among other things, “encourage borrowers to lie about
their incomes . . . in order to get a loan,” “knowingly lend more money
than a borrower can afford to pay,” and “charge more high interest
rates to borrowers based on their race or national origin and not on
their credit history.”105
Studies have shown that risky, subprime loans are indeed more
prevalent in minority communities.106 In the midst of the foreclosure
crisis, the New York Times ran an article regarding a recently published
study that indicated home buyers in predominately minority neighborhoods in New York were more likely to receive a subprime loan.107
New York University’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy conducted the analysis and found that in Jamaica Queens, forty-six
101
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percent of mortgages were issued by subprime lenders, whereas none
of the predominately white neighborhoods had a rate more than the
city’s average of 19.8%.108 A similar study in 2006 by the Center for
Responsible Lending showed that African-American borrowers with
prepayment penalties were six to thirty-four percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than white borrowers.109 Latino borrowers
were twenty-nine percent to 142% more likely to receive a higher-rate
loan than their white counterparts.110
Litigation has been one vehicle for parties to hold predatory
lenders accountable. Beginning in 2007, the NAACP alone sued several different financial institutions alleging that the institutions violated
the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts for their lending
practices.111 In general, lawsuits do not require the high degree of confidentiality that mediation does, so plaintiffs are in a better position to
hold the feet of the financial institutions to the fire. Legal commentators have also recognized that the legal system has a framework of
checks and rules to insure that biases and prejudice don’t affect the
rights of parties.112 Delgado’s “Fairness and Formality: Minimizing
the Risk in Alternative Dispute Resolution,” went into great depth regarding court mechanisms in place that “check and contain prejudice.”113 First, he noted, judges serve long terms and often have repetitive caseloads, diminishing the likelihood that the judge will rule based
solely on the parties to the litigation.114 Second, lawyers can also
check the biases of jurors through voir dire and peremptory challenges,
108
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although the latter has been subject to abuse.115 Third, rules of civil
procedure and evidence govern formal adjudications and can also
check prejudice by sanctioning parties for misconduct and facilitating
the introduction of relevant evidence.116
The available remedies in litigation as compared to mediation
also give force to litigation’s superiority as a vehicle to vindicate
rights. During mediation, the best-case scenario for many homeowners
is to stay in their homes with payments that they can afford through a
loan modification. In litigation, the injured party might receive a monetary award, and the party at fault might be deterred from future conduct from the sheer negative publicity of trial. Indeed, many of the
banks that contributed to the housing crisis have been the targets of
negative press.117
In President Obama’s January 2012 State of the Union Address, he announced the formation of a new Department of Justice unit
that would investigate and potentially prosecute the banks that caused
the collapse of the housing market.118 In 2009, Baltimore City sued
Wells Fargo bank for the bank’s unfair lending practices. 119 The city’s
suit marked the first time a municipality sued a financial institution for
its discriminatory lending practices since the foreclosure crisis began
in 2007.120 The city suffered a number of legal setbacks when its complaint was dismissed several times by a federal district court judge.121
Finally, in July 2012, Wells Fargo settled the case with the City by
agreeing to pay $175 million, the second-largest fair-lending settlement in the history of the Justice Department.122
115
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C. Maryland Should Re-Evaluate its Foreclosure Mediation
Law to Better Serve the Needs of the State’s
Most Vulnerable Homeowners.
On September 22, 2011, Governor O’Malley established the
Maryland Foreclosure Task Force.123 The task force was charged with
accomplishing three goals.124 The first was to identify key foreclosure
trends and the impact of foreclosures in the state.125 The second was to
identify strategies to “enhance loss mitigation outcomes for homeowners.”126 The task force’s final charge was to identify effective strategies to strengthen neighborhoods in the state that have been affected
by foreclosure.127 The task force released a report detailing its recommendations on January 11, 2012.128 Because the task force’s mandate
was broad, its recommendations were similarly scaled. However, the
report’s proposals to enhance loss mitigation are particularly instructive here.
Among the chief obstacles to loss mitigation cited in the report
were timing and income.129 It is important for homeowners to seek
housing counseling early, as there are often tight deadlines and narrow
windows to receive assistance.130 Many homeowners facing foreclosure have fallen on hard times and may be unemployed, making it
more difficult for the homeowner facing foreclosure to satisfy his or
her arrears.131 In the midst of the task force’s research, Maryland’s Office of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation instituted emergency
foreclosure regulations aimed at fixing some of the aforementioned
problems. The emergency changes revised the structure and language
of foreclosure documents, making them much easier for the average
homeowner to comprehend.132The task force’s recommendations to
enhance loss mitigation included a pre-file mediation proposal that
would introduce mediation as an option to both the homeowner and
the mortgage service prior to the filing of a foreclosure action in Cir123
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cuit Court.133 The report also recommended extended forbearance for
homeowners who have lost their jobs.134Additionally, the task force
suggested that homeowners facing foreclosure have a “single point of
contact” with the lender to prevent the frustration that homeowners often face when they are passed around from one representative to the
next and information is misplaced.135 The recommendations listed in
the report represent leaps toward the finish line of slowing foreclosures
in the state; however, Maryland should strongly consider moving from
an opt-in mediation system to an automatic mediation program.
1. The opt-in requirement fails to capture the most
needy at-risk homeowners.
Although Maryland’s foreclosure mediation program is a step
in the right direction, the “opt-in” requirement fails to capture a significant number of low-income homeowners who are least likely to take
advantage of the mediation process. Even when this cohort requests
mediation, confusing paperwork, legalese, and tight deadlines often
besiege them, limiting the likelihood of a successful settlement. Maryland should amend the law to replace the “opt-in” provision with an
“opt-out” provision or the state should institute automatic mediation
where the first mediation session is scheduled automatically once the
lender institutes a foreclosure action. This change will automatically
swallow-up all homeowners faced with foreclosure and reach a far
greater population than the current provision.
Nearly one year ago, the Boston Globe ran an editorial touting
the benefits of automatic mediation as support for the mayor’s effort to
make the city’s process automatic.136 The Globe rightfully pointed out
that automatic mediation helps build “transparency and communication into the foreclosure process.”137 The Center for American Progress (“CAP”) is also a proponent of automatic mediation.138 CAP
133
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goes further and recommends that the federal government also institute
automatic mediation through its mortgage entities.139
2. Strengthen external laws – whistleblower protection as a tool in the
foreclosure mitigation tool belt
At first blush, it is hard to imagine how whistleblower protection laws might relate to a strengthening of loss mitigation strategies,
but the seemingly irreparable state of this country’s housing market
has left little room for conventional parallels. One group, Progressive
States Action (“PSA”), describes its mission as one that “aims to transform the political landscape by sparking progressive actions at the
state level.”140 PSA included as part of its foreclosure and predatory
lending reform platform, a recommendation to legislatures to enact
laws that would “protect employees of financial institutions from retaliation when they reveal criminal or unethical conduct by their employers . . . .”141 This relatively straightforward idea has serious potential in
Maryland, where a recent Court of Appeals case has ripened the field
for this idea to take root.
In Lawson v. Bowie State University,142 the Maryland Court of
Appeals reinstated an employee after concluding that he was wrongfully terminated.143 Lawson, a nearly twenty-year veteran of the Bowie
State University Police Department superseded his department’s chain
of command when he reported his fellow officers’ misconduct to the
University’s Vice President of Student Affairs.144 The Vice-President
notified Lawson’s Department Chief who then fired Lawson for insubordination.145 Lawson challenged his firing before an administrative law judge and argued that he was entitled to whistleblower protection because the letter he wrote, which revealed his colleagues’
behavior, constituted a “protected disclosure.”146 The judge ruled that
the letter could not be considered a “protected disclosure” because it
was part and parcel of Lawson’s personal mission to improve his de139
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partment rather than the purpose of notifying a higher-up of a violation.147 The Court of Appeals concluded that the administrative judge
applied the wrong standard by zeroing in on Lawson’s motivations for
disclosure.148 The Court stated, “. . . [B]oth the WPA and Maryland’s
Whistleblower Protection statute require only that an employee have a
reasonable belief that he is reporting a violation, not that the employee
possess a purely altruistic motive for the disclosure.”149 The Court’s
ruling and the reasoning supporting it have broad application to loss
mitigation strategies.150
If a bank were state owned or otherwise state operated,151 the
Court’s interpretation of Maryland’s whistleblower protection law
would serve to counteract predatory or risky lending practices that
were prevalent during the subprime boom.152 In theory, using the
Court’s interpretation of the federal Whistleblower Protect Act and
Maryland’s Whistleblower Protection statute, an employee of a state
financial institution would have recourse to challenge his or her firing
if the firing was believed to have been triggered by the reporting or objecting to unfair, abusive or deceptive practices. This internal check
coupled with oversight of financial institutions might serve as a powerful tool to prevent unsuspecting homeowners from being entangled in
risky loans.
CONCLUSION
Home foreclosures existed before the housing crisis, and, by all
accounts, they will persist. How often they will occur and where they
will be concentrated, one can only predict. However, many states and
municipalities seem more prepared today to deal with the uncertainty
of the economic future than before the housing bubble burst. Mediation has become a critical tool for states as they try to soften the blow
147
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of the housing crisis. While mediation has proven successful in cities
like Philadelphia and has strong prospects for further success in Maryland, it is important to be cautious of the ways in which mediation
might prove to be less than ideal. Inequities in bargaining power and
the informality of ADR are both downsides of mediation that might
hurt more than they help minority communities. Litigation can be costly and lengthy, but it has the potential to better vindicate the rights of
homeowners who have been targeted through unfair lending practices.
If foreclosure mediation is here to stay, the state can strengthen loss
mitigation by switching the current mediation program from opt-in to
automatic mediation. Additionally, Maryland legislators and housing
advocates should consider the broad application of whistleblower protection laws to protect employees of financial institutions who wish to
expose unfair lending practices.

